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Introduction
This volume of twelve specially commissioned essays about species draws
on the perspectives of prominent researchers from anthropology , botany ,
developmental psychology , the philosophy of biology and science, protozoology
, and zoology . The concept of species has played a focal role in both
evolutionary biology and the philosophy of biology , and the last decade has
seen something of a publication boom on the topic (e.g., Otte and Endier
1989; Ereshefsky 1992b; Paterson 1994; lambert and Spence 1995; Claridge ,
Dawah , and Wilson 1997; Wheeler and Meier 1999; Howard and Berlocher
1998). Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays is distinguished from other recent
collections on species and the species problem in two ways .
First , by attempting to be more explicitly integrative and analytical , this
volume looks to go beyond both the exploration of the detailed implications
of any single species concept (cf. lambert and Spence 1995, and Wheeler and
Meier 1999) and the survey of the ways in which species are conceptualized
by researchers in various parts of biology (cf. Claridge , Dawah , and Wilson
1997). As a whole , it takes a step back from much of the biological nitty -
gritty that forms the core of these recent books on species in order to gain
some focus on general claims about and views of species. Authors for the
current volume were explicitly encouraged to address some subset of five
general themes that tied their particular discussions to broader issues about
species with a philosophical edge to them. Half the contributors have their
primary training in philosophy . The volume is thus deliberately more philo -
sophical in its orientation and in the content of the essays. Yet the biological
detail in Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays is, I believe , rich enough for the
volume as a whole to contribute both to the philosophy of biology and to
evolutionary biology itself .
Second, the volume adds historical and psychological dimensions typically
missing from contemporary discussions of species. The historical slant is
reflected in essays that consider the Linnaean hierarchy (e.g., Ereshefsky) and
the Modem Synthesis (e.g., Nanney ), as well as in those essays that draw
on more general considerations from the philosophy of science (e.g., Boyd )
. and in those that offer particular solutions to the species problem (e.g., de
Queiroz ). Although the principal purpose of these essays is not to contribute
to the history of biology , they are often able to appeal to that history in
order to enrich our understanding of species and the biological world . The
psychological perspective is most explicit in the essays by Atran and by Keil
and Richard son, but also underlies central arguments in several other papers
(e.g., by Wilson and by Griffiths ). Together , these two features of the volume
provide for a broad perspective on species and on the issues in the philoso -
phy of biology and in biology proper to which species are central .
The papers have been organized into five sections that seemed to me
to represent the most cohesive clusters of views and the most interesting
sequence of papers to read from beginning to end. Those sections are:
"Monism , Pluralism, Unity and Diversity " ; "Species and Life's Complications
" ; "Rethinking Natural Kinds "; "Species in Mind and Culture "; and
"Species Begone!" The rest of this introduction mainly provides an overview
of the papers in the order that they appear. There are, of course, other
thematic commonalities , shared perspectives, and oppositions that this
organization (or any single artifactual classification scheme, such as a table of
contents ) will obscure. One alternative way of thematically locating particular 
papers in the volume and of viewing the orientation of the volume as a
whole is to consider the five themes that authors were invited to address and
the pair of themes each paper concentrates on most intensely . Those themes,
ranked in order from those that feature in the highest number of papers to
those that feature in the smallest number , together with some accompanying
questions, are:
Unity , Integration , and Pluralism1
. Given the proliferation of species concepts in recent years, how should these
concepts be viewed ? In what ways do they compete with one another?
Which proposals should be seen as the main contenders for " the" species
concept, and by which criteria should they be evaluated? What are the prospects 
for developing an integrated species concept? Should one be a pluralist
about species? [Dupre , Hull , de Queiroz , Boyd , Wilson , Auan , Mishler ]
2 Species Realism
What sort of realism, if any, should one adopt with respect to species? In
what ways does our answer to this question both reflect and influence our
view of other elements in the Linnaean hierarchy ? What interplay is there
between a stance on the realism issue and broader issues in both the philos -
ophy of biology and the philosophy of science more generally ? [Dupre ,
Sterelny , Boyd , Wilson , Griffiths , Keil and Richard son, Ereshefsky]
3 Practical Import
questions asked
of evolutionary
under the other four
biology and related
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In what ways are answers to the
themes important for the practice
sciences? Should we view the resolution of the cluster of issues often called
" the species problem " as foundational in some way ? To what extent is
the species problem (merely ) definitional ? What is the relationship between
the species problem and empirical practice within the bilogical (and other )
sciences? [HulL de Queiroz , Nanney , Sterelny , Griffiths , Mishler ]
The summaries of the sections and essays indicate that many other issues
are raised in Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, including the plausibility of
the individuality thesis about species, the death of essentialism, the interplay
between ecology and evolution , the relationship between common sense and
scientific taxonomies , and the challenge that recent developmental systems
theory poses to taxonomy in terms of evolutionary homologies . Species: New
Interdisciplinary Essays advances debate about all of these issues. Between the
overviews of contemporary debates and the novel insights provided in
many of the essays, the volume should prove invaluable for professionals
working in the contributing fields and useful for advanced undergraduate
and graduate courses in either the foundations of evolutionary biology or
the philosophy of biology .
Let me turn more directly to the individual essays and the sections into
which they are organized , beginning with "Monism , Pluralism, Unity , and
Diversity " , containing papers by John Dupre , David Hull , and Kevin de
Queiroz . As the title of his essay ("On the Impossibility of a Monistic
Account of Species" ) suggests, Dupre argues for the rejection of monism
a,bout species. He claims, moreover , that this conclusion is the proper one to
draw from the complete assimilation of Darwin 's insights about the organization 
of the biological world . There are no perfectly sharp boundaries between
preexisting natural kinds - species- that would allow for a monistic account
of species. Rather, what we find when we investigate the biological world is
Historical Dimensions4
In what ways are the views of major historical figures or movements in evolutionary 
biology of significance for contemporary views of species? Is our
own view of important historical episodes (e.g., formation of the Linnaean
hierarchy , the Modem Synthesis) skewed in important ways? How can we
shed light on contemporary discussions by reflecting on the recent history of
evolutionary biology ? [Nanney , Ereshefsky]
5 Cognitive Underpinnings
To what extent do the literature on children 's naive biology and anthropo -
logical work in cross-cultural psychology support nativist and universalist
views of species? What fruitful interplay exists between explorations of the
mental representation of biological knowledge and the philosophy of biology 
as it has been traditionally circumscribed ? [Atran , Keil and Richard son]
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diversity, and our schemes of classification should reflect both this diversity
and our various theoretical and practical ways of exploring the biological
world . As well as recounting familiar objections to the numerous attempts to
provide a monistic account of species, Dupre also offers novel responses to
some putative problems facing pluralism. However, he tempers his pluralism,
and the acknowledgment that our taxonomic system is the product of a
highly contingent process, with a concession to monism: because one of the
points of biological taxonomy is to facilitate communication between scientists
, we ought to view species as the basal unit in one overarching taxo-
nomic hierarchy. Thus dispensing with overlapping taxonomies, this view
represents a less radical version of pluralism than Dupre himself has advocated 
in the past (e.g., Dupre 1993; cf. Kitcher 1984).
Hull is more sceptical about the prospects for pluralistic accounts of species 
in his essay, "On the Plurality of Species: Questioning the Party Line."
After sketching some broad issues that arise more generally with "respect to
pluralist views, he turns to examine some of the prominent expressions of
pluralism by Kitcher (1984), Ereshefsky (1992a), and Stanford (1995). Hull
then turns to compare his own (1997) attempts to classify and evaluate the
plethora of species concepts with Mayden's attempts (1997). Whereas Hull
reached the "grudging conclusion," as he calls it here, in 1997 that no one
species concept won out within the criteria he proposed, Mayden arrived at
a form of monism. Returning to one of the earlier themes of his essay, Hull
attributes the difference here in part to the fact that as a practicing scientist ,
Mayden has to make more definitive theoretical commitments than a philosopher 
who stands outside the practice of science and surveys options.
Stances on the pluralism issue typically reflect social and institutional facts
about the advocates of those stances, rather than bias-free views argued out
from first principles.
The third essay in this section, de Queiroz's "The General Lineage Concept 
of Species and the Defining Properties of the Species Category," develops 
a solution to the species problem that de Queiroz has recently (1998)
defended: what he calls the general lineage concept of species. This view
equates species with segments of population lineages, and de Queiroz argues
not only that it underlies "virtually all modem ideas about species," but that
it illuminates a wide range of issues about species, including debates about
speciation, the individuality thesis, and species realism. de Queiroz also proposes 
that it allows one to dissolve the debate between monists and plural-
ists. He continues by tracing the history of the population lineage concept
from Darwin through the early part of the Modem Synthesis in the work of
Huxley, Mayr, Dobzhansky, and Wright , to the more explicitly lineage-
focused concepts of Simpson, Hennig, and Wiley . Although this historical
sketch constitutes a minor part of de Queiroz 's wide -ranging essay, it serves
to buttress his proposals about the ways in which the population lineage
concept underlies many apparent disagreements between advocates of different 
species concepts. The paper concludes with a philosophical diagnosis
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of why this underlying unity has been largely unrecognized in contemporary
debates .
The two papers in the next section, "Species and Life's Complications,"
look at very different issues that arise for particular species concepts. David
Nanney's 'When Is a Rose?: The Kinds of Tetrahymena," probes Mayr 's
biological species concept (BSC) and the notions that it employs, such as a
closed gene pool, from the perspective of a longtime practicing ciliate biologist
. Nanney conveys interesting information about the ciliates (Tetrahymena
in particular)- such as the relative independence of genetic and morpholog-
ical subdivisions , and the clonal propagation of these ancient protists (some
of which include asexually reproducing populations)- that pose problems
for the BSC; he also reveals enough of the history of protozoology to suggest 
why the field has a strained relationship to the Modem Synthesis and
concepts forged during it . One striking conclusion of the essay is that
microbiology, having essentially bypassed the Modem Synthesis, awaits a
new synthesis that focuses on more than the most recent snapshot of a history 
of life that stretch es back almost four billion years.
Kim Sterelny's essay, "Species as Ecological Mosaics," offers a defense of
a form of realism about species committed neither to universalism about any
species concept or definition nor to any type of species selection . Some (but
not all) species form what Sterelny calls ecological mosaics; which are made up
of ecologically diverse populations of organisms. As structured and diverse
metapopulations, such mosaics are subject to evolutionary change when
there is an ecological or geographic fracturing of the metapopulation, but
they are also stabilized by what he calls Mayr 's Brake, the mechanisms of
reproductive isolation central to Mayr 's well-known account of speciation.
Sterelny explores this idea through a discussion of Vrba's and El dredges
views of evolutionary change in which he argues, amongst other things,
that those views should be divorced from their authors ' own fondness for
Paterson's (1985) recognition concept of species. Sterelny 's scepticism about
universalism and thus monism draws on the claim that , like organisms,
species and the complex, ecological organization they possess were invented
at some point in evolutionary time, forming a grade of biological organization 
that, like organismal individuality , only some clusters of biological
entities have .
The essays by Richard Boyd, Paul Griffiths, and Rob Wilson in the next
section, "Rethinking Natural Kinds," revive the onto logical issue of whether
species are natural kinds or individuals by offering a reexamination of the
notion of a natural kind. Boyd's paper, "Homeostasis, Species, and Higher
Taxa," develops the conception of homeostatic property cluster (HPC) kinds
that he briefly introduced in earlier work (1988, 1991). Here, Boyd both provides 
the broader philosophical context in which that conception functions 
and shows how it applies to several issues concerning species. More
specifically, he defends the idea that HPC kinds are an integral part of an
overall , realist view of science that accommodates the inexactitude , natural
vagueness, and historicity of many sciences, including the biological
sciences. He then argues that species and at least some higher taxa are HPC
kinds, and indicates how his view makes plausible a form of pluralistic realism
. A passing theme in the essay is that in the HPC conception of natural
kinds, the contrast between natural kinds and individuals is of less importance 
than it is in a traditional notion of natural kinds, thus deflating the significance 
of the individuality thesis about species defended by Hull (1978)
and Ghiselin (1974, 1997), and the subsequent debate over it .
My own contribution - "Realism, Essence, and Kind : Resuscitating Species
Essentialism7"- takes its cue from Boyd 's earlier work on HPC kinds . After
outlining how both the individuality thesis about species taxa and pluralism
about the species category have been developed because of problems with
traditional realism, I use two examples from the taxonomy of neural states to
suggest that there is more than merely conceptual space for a view closer to
traditional realism than either of these fairly radical proposals . This middleground 
position is a version of the HPC view of natural kinds, and in contrast 
to Boyd 's own development of this view , I argue that this position is
incompatible with both the individuality thesis and pluralistic realism. This
essay thus steps outside of the philosophy of biology to the philosophy of
psychology and neuroscience to shed some light on natural kinds more generally 
and on realism and pluralism about species in particular .
Griffiths 's "Squaring the Circle : Natural Kinds with Historical Essences"
looks at the treatment of the notion of natural kinds by a variety of
researchers across the biological sciences, including systematists (regarding
species taxa) and process structuralists (regarding developmental biology ).
Griffiths defends the idea that natural kinds can have historical essences,
using this idea to address the claim that there are no (or few ) laws of nature
in the biological sciences. For Griffiths , concepts of taxa and of parts and
process es in biology can be based on the idea of an evolutionary rather than
a distinctly structural or developmental homology . Griffiths sees phyloge -
netic inertia and its basis in the developmental structure of organisms as a
mechanism for producing what Boyd calls the "causal homeostasis" of natural 
kinds .
The two papers in the next section, "Species in Mind and Culture ," present 
perspectives on the issues surrounding the psychological and cultural
representations of central biological concepts, such as the species concept . In
"The Universal Primacy of Generic Species in Folkbiological Taxonomy :
Implications for Human Biological , Cultural , and Scientific Evolution " , Scott
Atran draws on recent cross-cultural experimental research with the Maya in
Guatemala and with midwestem urban college students that probes the
strength of inductive inferences across various levels of biological categories.
Atran has found surprising similarities across these forest -dwelling and
urbanized populations that cry out for psychological explanation . He argues
for the universality across cultures of what he calls generic species, a level of
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organization in the biological world that doesn't distinguish the Linnaean
species and genus categories; he proposes a domain-specific representation
of this category and explores its relationship to essence-based habits of the
mind and the cultural development of various species concepts in Western
science. Atran concludes his paper with some thoughts about recent views of
pluralism and species and about what these views imply about the relation
between common sense and science .
Frank Keil and Daniel Richard son discuss the psychological representation 
of species and of biological knowledge more generally in their essay,
"Species, Stuff, and Patterns of Causation." They argue that the substantial
developmental literature on biological knowledge often presents amisleading 
conception of what intuitive or folkbiology must be like in order for
species and other biological categories to have the distinctive psychological
features that they do, suggesting several new lines of empirical research. By
exploring what has been called "psychological essentialism" about biological
kinds and its relationship to essentialism in the philosophy of biology, Keil
and Richard son call for more careful empirical examination of the nature
of our mental representation of the biological world and identify a number
of cognitive blases that contribute to what they call the "vivid illusion of
species." They claim that although species do seem to have a distinctive psychological 
representation, the specific form that representation takes remains
largely an open empirical question.
The concluding section- "Species Begone!"- contains two essays that, in
their own ways, express some skepticism about the special reality of species
that is the focus of biological and philosophical controversy regarding
species (as in "the species problem"). Both authors feel that species are as real
as higher taxa, but no more than the genuses, families, orders, and so on that
those species constitute. Marc Ereshefsky's "Species and the Linnaean Hierarchy
" offers a review of our current thinking about the species category,
advocating a replacement of the entire Linnaean system of classification. Ere-
shefsky questions the distinctive reality of the species category by pointing
to the problems in drawing the distinction between species and higher taxa
and by using the critiques of monistic accounts of species that motivate
pluralism to suggest the heterogeneity of the species category. Because
the point of the Linnaean hierarchy and the distinctions that it draws (e.g.,
between species and higher taxa) has been lost through the Darwinian revolution
, our current taxonomic practice creates problems that alternative systems 
of classification may avoid. Ereshefsky concludes by examining two
such systems, though he acknowledges that any change should not be made
lightly .
In "Getting Rid of Species?" Brent Mishler explores the application of
phylogenetics to species taxa. Like Ereshefsky, Mishler views the Linnaean
hierarchy as outdated, and like de Queiroz (1992; cf. de Queiroz, chapter 3 in
this volume), he thinks that phylogenetic schemes of classification are necessary
. Mishler argues that taxa at all levels, including the least inclusive,
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should be recognized because of evidence for monophyly . He believes that
the failure of the various species concepts to uniquely define the species rank
in the phylogenetic hierarchy reflects reality , thus highlighting the need to
get rid of the species rank altogether . Thus, a rank-free phylogenetic taxon -
omy should be applied consistently to all taxa, including the least inclusive .
Mishler concludes by reflecting on the implications of his proposed reform
on our ecological thinking about biodiversity and conservation .
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